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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case requires us to review the factors a district court 
should consider in deciding whether a drug courier or 
"mule" convicted of importation may be characterized as a 
minor participant in the offense, such that a downward 
adjustment in sentencing pursuant to S 3B1.2 of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines may be warranted. The 
district court concluded that, as a courier, the defendant's 
role was "essential" and he was not a minor participant. 
Because we cannot determine whether this conclusion was 
a factual finding, or was based on an interpretation of the 
sentencing guidelines, we will vacate and remand for 
resentencing consistent with this opinion. See United States 
v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Colletti, 984 F.2d 1339, 1348 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
I. 
 
While in Colombia on a vacation, Oscar Ivan Isaza-Zapata 
was approached by two men, Carlos and Tyson, in a park. 
The men offered to pay him $16,000 to transport 800 
grams of heroin to the United States. In need of money for 
a foot operation, Isaza-Zapata agreed. He later met Carlos 
and Tyson at a hotel in Perriera, Colombia, where they gave 
him 100 pellets of heroin to swallow. They provided him 
with a ticket to Newark, where he was to meet another man 
named Carlos. 
 
Upon his arrival at Newark International Airport, Isaza- 
Zapata was subjected to a routine customs examination. 
After his demeanor aroused suspicion, Isaza-Zapata was 
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asked to consent to an X-ray examination. Isaza-Zapata 
signed the consent form and was transported to Bayonne 
Medical Center, where he passed approximately 100 pellets 
containing heroin. He advised the customs agents that he 
had been paid to bring narcotics into the United States. 
Isaza-Zapata attempted to cooperate with Customs officials 
by placing a call to his United States contact, but was 
unsuccessful. 
 
In a one count indictment, the grand jury charged Isaza- 
Zapata with knowingly and intentionally importing into the 
United States more than 100 grams of heroin in violation of 
21 U.S.C. SS 952(a) & 960(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. S 2. Isaza- 
Zapata subsequently pled guilty. At sentencing, he 
requested a two-point downward adjustment in his offense 
level as a minor participant. The government agreed that 
Isaza-Zapata was entitled to the downward adjustment. The 
district court, however, declined to grant the adjustment. 
The court sentenced Isaza-Zapata to 60 months 
imprisonment, four years supervised release, a $1,000 fine, 
and a special assessment of $100. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. We employ a mixed standard 
of review when considering whether a defendant was 
entitled to a downward adjustment as a minor participant. 
See United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir. 
1994). We exercise plenary review where the district court's 
denial of a downward adjustment is based primarily on a 
legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. See 
United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 
1990). However, where the district court's decision rests on 
factual determinations, we review for clear error. See id. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied the 
two-point downward adjustment, stating only that"I find 
that his role is essential for the commission of the crime 
and that he is not a minor participant." The district court 
did not set forth any other reasons for its determination, 
and it is not clear whether the district court assessed the 
relative culpability of Isaza-Zapata as compared to others 
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and considered the factors we have outlined in United 
States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1990), in relation 
to the other participants, or whether the court had adopted 
a practice whereby mules or couriers do not qualify for a 
minor role adjustment because they are "essential." With 
respect to the latter, we note that because the 
determination of whether a defendant is entitled to a minor 
role adjustment is highly dependent on the facts of 
particular cases, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
S 3B1.2, Background Commentary, a mechanical 
application of the guidelines by which a court always denies 
minor role adjustments to couriers because they are 
"essential," regardless of the particular facts or 
circumstances, would be inconsistent with this guidance. 
See United States v. King, 53 F.3d 589, 591-92 (3d Cir. 
1995) (finding that sentencing "practices" are proscribed 
under S 5K1.1 of the Guidelines). 
 
We do not hold that the district court erred in refusing to 
grant Isaza-Zapata a minor role adjustment. We are simply 
unable to determine the basis of the district court's ruling 
from the record. Since our standard of review turns on 
whether the court denied the downward adjustment based 
on a proper legal interpretation of the mitigating role 
provision based on the facts of this particular case, see 
Carr, 25 F.3d at 1207, we conclude that the appropriate 
course of action is to remand to allow the district court to 
state the basis for its ruling, and we take this opportunity 
to review the proper standards if the court wishes to clarify 
or reconsider its ruling in light of this opinion. See 
Mummert, 34 F.3d at 205. 
 
III. 
 
The Sentencing Guidelines permit adjustments to a 
defendant's offense level based on the role that he played in 
committing the offense. Section 3B1.2 affords a reduction 
in the offense level if the defendant was either a minimal or 
a minor participant: 
 
       Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease 
       the offense level as follows: 
 
       (a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any 
       criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. 
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       (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in an y 
       criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. 
 
       In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 
       levels. 
 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 3B1.2. The district 
courts are allowed broad discretion in applying this section, 
and their rulings are left largely undisturbed by the courts 
of appeal. See United States Sentencing Commission, 1996 
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics (1996) (stating 
that the affirmance rate under S 3B1.2 is 99.3%). 
 
The background commentary to this provision indicates 
that its application is heavily dependent on the facts of a 
particular case, and that the reduction is available for a 
defendant whose role in the offense makes him 
substantially less culpable than the average participant. 
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 3B1.2, 
Background Commentary. Section 3B1.2 does not itself 
define the term "participant," but an application note to 
S 3B1.1, which addresses a defendant's aggravating role in 
the offense, defines a participant as "a person who is 
criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, 
but need not have been convicted. A person who is not 
criminally responsible for the commission of the offense 
(e.g., an undercover law enforcement officer) is not a 
participant." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ManualS 3B1.1, 
Application Note 1. That same definition of "participant" 
should also apply to the mitigating role provision. See 
United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1402 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 
It is clear that the adjustments for a defendant's role in 
the offense apply where there has been concerted activity 
involving one or more participants. The application notes 
indicate that "a minor participant means any participant 
who is less culpable than most other participants, but 
whose role could not be described as minimal." U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 3B1.2, Application Note 3. 
The notes further explain that a defendant who plays a 
minimal role in concerted activity is one who is among the 
least culpable of those involved in the group conduct. Such 
factors as a defendant's lack of knowledge or understanding 
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of the overall enterprise and of others' activities are 
evidence of a minimal role in the offense. See U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 3B1.2, Application Note 1. 
Thus, the two prerequisites to the application ofS 3B1.2 are 
multiple participants and a differentiation in levels of 
culpability. See Katora, 981 F.2d at 1405. The Guideline 
provides little additional guidance, however, to district 
courts attempting to determine whether a particular 
defendant played a minor role. 
 
In Headley, we adopted the following principles, as 
enunciated by the Second Circuit, as relevant to the 
determination of whether a courier is a minor participant: 
"`[t]he culpability of a defendant courier must depend 
necessarily on such factors as the nature of the defendant's 
relationship to the other participants, the importance of the 
defendant's actions to the success of the venture, and the 
defendant's awareness of the nature and scope of the 
criminal enterprise."' 923 F.2d at 1084 (quoting United 
States v. Garcia, 920 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
Although both Headley and Garcia involved defendant drug 
couriers, it should be noted that the relevance of these 
factors is not necessarily limited to couriers. Rather, these 
considerations are directed generally towards a defendant's 
involvement, knowledge, and culpability, and should 
provide guidance in any case. See United States v. Price, 13 
F.3d 711, 735 (3d Cir. 1994) (referring to Headley factors in 
discussion of non-courier defendant's role in offense). 
 
Since S 3B1.2 is ultimately concerned with the 
defendant's relative culpability, a district court should 
consider the defendant's conduct under the Headley factors 
in relation to the other participants. See Bierley, 922 F.2d 
at 1065 ("[T]he adjustments authorized by the role in the 
offense adjustments are directed to the relative culpability 
of participants in group conduct."). By the express terms of 
the application notes, the other participants must be 
criminally responsible. However, they need not have been 
charged with any offense. See id. (noting that there may be 
more than one participant even where there is only one 
defendant). The other participants "[do] not have to be 
guilty of [the offense charged] in connection with [the] 
scheme so long as their own criminal conduct made it 
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possible." United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 659 (3d Cir. 
1991); see also United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 
969-70 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
In 1990, the Sentencing Commission clarified the scope 
of the conduct relevant to the role in the offense 
adjustment, and the introductory commentary now directs 
that the determination of the defendant's relative culpability 
for purposes of assessing the applicability of the 
adjustment must be made on the basis of all relevant 
conduct -- namely, all conduct within the scope ofS 1B1.3 
-- and not simply on the basis of the elements and acts 
referenced in the count of conviction.1  See U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, Ch. 3, Pt. B, intro. comment; see also 
Headley, 923 F.2d at 1084 n. 2; United States v. Murillo, 
933 F.2d 195, 198 n.1 (3d Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the 
appropriateness of a minor role adjustment turns on"the 
relativity of [the defendant's] conduct to the total [relevant 
conduct] . . . ." Headley, 923 F.2d at 1085. 
 
Although some of the courts considering this issue have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 1B1.3(a) defines relevant conduct as: 
 
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, ab etted, counseled, 
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; 
and 
 
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal a ctivity (a criminal 
plan, 
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert 
with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably 
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the 
offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course 
of 
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense; 
 
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character  for which S 3D1.2(d) 
would require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions 
described in subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the 
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 
conviction; 
 
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omiss ions specified in 
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of 
such acts and omissions; and 
 
(4) any other information specified in the appli cable guideline 
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noted the centrality or essential nature of the courier's role, 
they have done so in pointed response to the defendants' 
contentions that a courier should automatically qualify for 
a minor role adjustment, and have proceeded then to 
engage in an analysis of the defendant's conduct in relation 
to others. See United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 427-28 
(6th Cir. 1993) (finding mere fact that defendant courier 
was less culpable than organizers, leaders, managers, or 
supervisors does not itself establish that she was minor 
participant); United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 138 
(5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the argument that minimal 
participant status may be inferred as a matter of law from 
courier status). These cases do not stand for the 
proposition that the minor role adjustment never applies to 
couriers, or that the court should forego an analysis of the 
defendant's relative role. 
 
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that 
other participants were involved and that, under the 
standards set forth above and the facts of his particular 
case, the minor role adjustment should apply. See Price, 13 
F.3d at 735 (citing United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 
285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989)). In the instant case, the record 
indicates that Isaza-Zapata was approached by Carlos and 
Tyson to transport heroin to the United States. Isaza- 
Zapata knew no one else involved in the scheme, and had 
no knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy. Carlos and 
Tyson provided Isaza-Zapata with pre-packaged heroin, 
showed him how to swallow the packages and how to 
travel, and provided him with a plane ticket. 
 
Although this offense involving several participants with 
different roles is exactly the type of situation in which a 
minor role adjustment should be considered, two 
arguments are commonly advanced to discourage the 
application of the minor role adjustment in this type of 
case. First, the government contends that a courier like 
Isaza-Zapata, who is not charged with conspiracy, does not 
play a minor role in the importation with which he is 
charged. However, the fact that no conspiracy is charged 
does not preclude consideration of the minor role 
adjustment as long as other participants were involved in 
the relevant conduct. Even if the defendant is charged only 
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with, for example, importation or receiving stolen goods, if 
the evidence demonstrates that other participants were 
involved, the district court can consider whether the 
defendant played a minor role in the relevant conduct. See 
Bierley, 922 F.2d at 1069-70. It is the nature of the 
relevant conduct shown, and all the participants' roles in it, 
that is determinative -- not the nature or name of the 
offense charged as such. Relevant conduct includes acts 
and omissions "that occurred during the commission of the 
offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in 
the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility 
for that offense . . . ." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
S 1B1.3(a)(1). Accordingly, consideration of a downward 
adjustment requires only other participants in the conduct 
relevant to the offense of conviction, with differing levels of 
culpability. 
 
Second, the government argues that no minor role 
adjustment is available where the defendant is charged only 
with the amount of drugs or money with which he was 
involved, or which he, in this instance, carried. The scope 
of the relevant conduct that a court should consider in 
assessing the applicability of the minor role adjustment, 
however, is broader than merely the conduct required by 
the elements of the offense of conviction. Even if a courier 
is charged with importing only the quantity of drugs that he 
actually carried, there may still be other participants 
involved in the conduct relevant to that small amount or 
that one transaction. See United States v. Rodriguez De 
Varon, 136 F.3d 740, 745 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 
The Seventh Circuit has expressed skepticism as to a 
defendant's entitlement to a minor role adjustment in such 
a situation. In United States v. Lampkins, the court stated 
that where a defendant is sentenced only for the quantity of 
drugs that he himself handled, "it makes no sense to claim 
that [he] is a minor participant in [his] own conduct." 47 
F.3d 175, 181. In that case, the district court could have 
based the defendant's original offense level and sentence on 
amounts in his co-conspirators transactions with which he 
was not personally involved but which were reasonably 
foreseeable to him. See id. at 180. Because the defendant 
already received a lower sentence based only on his own 
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acts, the court found that a further minor role reduction 
was not required. See id. at 181. Thereafter, in United 
States v. Burnett, the court stated that "[w]hen a courier is 
held accountable only for the amounts he carries, he plays 
a significant rather than a minor role in that offense." 66 
F.3d 137, 140 (7th Cir. 1995). The court recognized that 
the defendant was a small cog in the overall scheme, but 
read S 3B1.2 as requiring the district court to determine 
whether the defendant played a minor role in relation to the 
conduct for which he has been held accountable. See id. 
The court evaluated the defendant's role, and affirmed the 
district court's denial of a minor role adjustment. See id. at 
141. 
 
We disagree with Burnett. The district court must 
examine all relevant conduct, not merely the defendant's, in 
assessing his relative culpability. The Eleventh Circuit 
shares this view. In Rodriguez De Varon, the Eleventh 
Circuit expressly stated that "[w]e reject [the] rationale [of 
Burnett and Lampkins]." See 136 F.3d at 745.2 Rather, the 
court recognized that the argument that a defendant 
cannot be a minor participant in his own conduct 
"overlooks the fact that the `relevant conduct' a court must 
consider in an importation scheme includes much more 
than the lone acts of the actual courier." Id. 
 
Accordingly, although the amount of drugs with which 
the defendant is charged may be an important factor which 
weighs heavily in the court's view of the defendant's relative 
culpability, it does not necessarily preclude a minor role 
adjustment with one exception. Application Note 4 to 
S 3B1.2 indicates that a downward adjustment as a minor 
participant is not available to a defendant who has already 
received a lower offense level by virtue of being convicted of 
a substantially less serious offense than warranted by his 
actual conduct. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that it is not entirely clear that the holding of Burnett would 
preclude a minor role adjustment every time a defendant is sentenced on 
the basis only of the amount of drugs with which he was directly 
involved. The court, although affirming the district court's denial of the 
minor role adjustment, emphasized the discretion of the district court 
and specifically stated that it would not have disturbed the decision even 
if the district court had ruled the other way. See 66 F.3d at 141. 
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S 3B1.2, Application Note 4. If this provision applies, the 
adjustment is not warranted. Courts have consistently 
applied this provision to preclude a minor role adjustment 
to defendants convicted of offenses less serious than 
warranted by their actual conduct. For example, where a 
larger conspiracy in which the defendant was involved is 
not taken into account in the charged offense that sets the 
defendant's base offense level, the defendant is not entitled 
to a reduction for his minor role in that conspiracy. See 
United States v. Gomez, 31 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 555-56 (8th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Olibrices, 979 F.2d 1557, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 
1992). In this case, Isaza-Zapata was sentenced on the 
basis only of the amount of drugs which he carried, but 
there is no indication that he was convicted of an offense 
less serious than warranted by his actual conduct, and 
Application Note 4 should not preclude a minor role 
adjustment. 
 
There may be some crimes which by their nature will 
normally involve only the defendant as the sole participant 
in the offense of conviction. See United States v. Romualdi, 
101 F.3d 971, 975 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that possession is 
a crime that on its face requires no concerted activity). 
However, the court should resist generalizations as to 
offenses by their assumed nature, and look rather to the 
facts of each case. If the defendant proves that there were 
other participants in the relevant conduct, which by 
definition includes the acts and omissions of others and is 
not limited to the elements of the offense charged, the 
potential exists for a role adjustment. See U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual S 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); see also Rodriguez De 
Varon, 136 F.3d at 745 (rejecting the argument that a 
defendant cannot be a minor participant in his own 
conduct); United States v. Webster, 996 F.2d 209, 212 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (considering the minor role adjustment for a 
defendant convicted of possession with intent to distribute); 
United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1061 (1992) (same). For 
example, we recognized in Romualdi that the offense of 
receipt of child pornography -- which on its face focuses 
solely on the defendant recipient -- can involve concerted 
relevant conduct between the sender and the defendant. 
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See 101 F.3d at 975. We likewise recognize that a 
defendant may play a minor role in importing the amount 
of drugs that he himself carried. As the Eleventh Circuit 
has noted, other participants in the conduct relevant to the 
importation may include the persons who provided the 
drugs, who solicited the courier, who were to receive the 
drugs in the United States, and who procured buyers or 
distributors for the drugs. See Rodriguez De Varon, 136 
F.3d at 745; see also United States v. Calderon-Porras, 911 
F.2d 421, 423-24 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that drug 
smuggling operations have many participants and that drug 
smuggling is a concerted activity). The district court should 
compare the defendant courier's culpability to the 
culpability of those other participants. 
 
Accordingly, the mere fact that a courier was not charged 
with conspiracy or was charged only with the amount of 
drugs in his possession does not necessarily preclude 
consideration of a minor role adjustment. By the same 
token, a courier is not automatically entitled to a minor role 
adjustment. See Headley, 923 F.2d at 1084 (citations 
omitted); see also United States v. Rossy, 953 F.2d 321, 
326 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 
310 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 
135, 138 (5th Cir. 1989). A courier's role can vary widely, 
and we reject any per se rule regarding the applicability of 
the minor role adjustment. Rather, there is no limit to the 
extent of a court's factual inquiry and assessment of the 
defendant's relative culpability. While a district court does 
exercise broad discretion in determining whether a 
particular defendant played a minor role, the court must 
engage in the appropriate analysis. We cannot determine 
whether the district court did so in this case based on the 
record before us. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the sentence 
and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
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